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Resumo
O Afeganistão e a Batalha pelo Controlo das 
Percepções do Público: Como Compreender a 
Campanha de Comunicação Estratégica dos 
Insurgentes
O autor pretende contra ‑argumentar relativamente 
a alguma da opinião pública formada que defende 
que os insurrectos afegãos não possuem uma 
abordagem sistémica às actividades de informa‑
ção, ao advogar que a estrutura e estratégia da 
insurreição revelam um adversário plenamente 
empenhado no planeamento estratégico e na 
coordenação de actividades em todos os domínios, 
em particular no plano da comunicação estraté‑
gica, a qual tem um papel central em todas as 
fases das suas operações.
Os insurrectos planeiam de forma activa e deli‑
berada as suas acções de combate em apoio da 
sua campanha mais abrangente de forma a 
afectar o domínio cognitivo da audiência ‑alvo. 
Ao fazê ‑lo, criaram um sofisticado aparelho 
destinado a ganhar a batalha da influência e 
controlo das percepções da opinião pública afegã, 
muçulmana e mundial sobre o desenvolvimento 
da guerra, através da articulação da sua narrativa 
com base em temas e mensagens cuidadosamente 
seleccionados.
Abstract
The author wants to counter some of today’s informed 
opinion, especially where that tends to be dismissive 
of the afghan insurgents’ systematic approach to 
information activities, when argues that the structure 
and strategy of the insurgency reveals an adversary 
fully engaged in strategic planning and coordination 
action in all domains, in particular in strategic 
communications, which plays a central role in all 
stages of their operations. 
The insurgents actively plan their kinetic actions to 
support the non ‑kinetic campaign deliberately to 
function in and affect the cognitive domain. In doing 
so, the insurgents have created a sophisticated 
apparatus to engage in the battle for the control of 
public perceptions of the war. The insurgents fully 
articulate their narrative with well ‑chosen themes 
and messages, which intend to reach out and influence 
Afghan and Muslim population minds worldwide.
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Afghanistan and the Battle for the control of Public Perceptions: 
Understanding the insurgents´ “Strategic communications” campaign
“…Wars today cannot be won without media. Media aims at the 




While many aspects of the insurgents’ modus operandi in Afghanistan have 
received major attention and analysis, their information activities have frequently 
been treated in a simplistic way by commentators. Some refer to the insurgents’ 
apparent lack of doctrine; others put stress on their inability to distinguish 
between what to a western observer are the strategic and operational levels of 
the war (Foxley, 2007); many dismiss such activities as mere propaganda (icG, 
2008); and some (perhaps more careful) analysts prefer to reflect a more structu-
red approach and go as far as to call up such terms as information Operations 
(nissen, 2009). 
Although many of these commentators are to a certain extent correct, they miss 
a crucial point: insurgent groups clearly think in terms of relationship between 
ends, ways and means. Their information activities in fact cover a broad range of 
the vital functions of any effective communications campaign.2 They certainly de-
liver in systematic fashion, segmenting the audience, developing different themes 
and messages per segment which they deliver through appropriate means with 
deliberate intention.
in wishing to counter some of today’s informed opinion, especially where that 
tends to be dismissive of the insurgents’ systematic approach to information ac-
tivities, this paper argues that the structure and strategy of the insurgency reve-
als a resilient adversary, fully engaged in strategic planning and coordination 
action (dorronsoro, 2009). This is evidenced in all domains, in particular in 
strategic communications. in doing so, the insurgents have created a sophisticated 
 1 interview published on the Taliban website Al -Emarah. Maiwandi is the editor in chief of 
Al -Emarah (Gwakh, 2011).
 2 For the sake of simplicity, undifferentiated terms such as insurgent are used here – rather than 
Taliban or similar – to refer to the most important insurgent groups: the Taliban, the Hezb -e -Islami 
Gholboddin (HiG) and the so called Haqqani network. despite being the single most important 
grouping, the Taliban movement certainly does not have a monopoly where the insurgency is 
concerned.
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apparatus that in key areas allows them to outperform the international forces’ 
efforts, in the battle for the control of public perceptions of the war. This holds 
true not only within Afghanistan itself, but is to a considerable degree also true 
worldwide.3
The insurgents have understood that communications are strategically vital to 
success. As holds true for nATO and the wider (western) international community, 
the insurgents’ strategic communications (Stratcom) effort also plays a central role 
in all stages of their operations (AcO, 2009). it is an effort to elaborate to be simply 
considered the mere exercise of propaganda or information operations, and such 
an approach neither provides sufficient explanation nor understanding of what are 
truly holistic efforts. 
We also argue that the insurgents actively plan their kinetic actions to support 
the non -kinetic campaign, and – reportedly – plan and use in an appropriate and 
well -coordinated fashion all their communications’ activities and capabilities4. 
These actions are deliberately conceived to function in and affect the cognitive 
domain, and are not standalone capabilities. They are very well integrated into the 
insurgents’ operational planning and execution.
The insurgents fully articulate their narrative with well -chosen themes and 
messages, which intend to reach out and influence Afghan and Muslim population 
minds worldwide. Their core narrative resonates with their audiences, and their 
operations and actions are consistent with that narrative,5 with some effort being 
made to ensure a clear linkage between the two.
The term “strategic communications” has been deliberately chosen in the title 
of this essay, directly attaching it to the insurgents – perhaps provocatively – in 
order to underline disquiet with those who depict a complex process as basic and 
 3 We can try to “measure” the international support to the war in Afghanistan through public opi-
nion surveys. The information available allows us to identify trends. According to surveys 
conducted by the Pew Research center since 2007 up to the time this article was written, the 
support to the war has been diminishing. in June 2009, there was already a majority opposing 
the war in every one of the nATO countries surveyed: Germany (63% opposition), France (62%), 
Poland (57%), canada (55%), Britain (51%), Spain (50%), and Turkey (49%). Surveys held in the 
second semester of 2011 confirmed this negative trend. even in countries like the US and the 
UK we can find a majority against the war: 58% of Americans oppose, while only 37% favor 
it; 57% of Britons want their soldiers out of Afghanistan; more than two -thirds of Germans are 
against; 76% of people in France oppose their country’s military involvement in Afghanistan; 
75% of canadians think that the war in Afghanistan has not been worth its financial cost. For 
a résumé on the evolution of the support to the war see, among others: http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/international_public_opinion_on_the_war_in_Afghanistan.
 4 Wording from Ad 95 -2.
 5 idem.
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unsophisticated6. even if we are able to avoid incursions into the conceptual 
domain, it is possible to provide additional explanation in justification of our 
standpoint. 
despite considerable and even exhaustive effort by many talented individuals, 
Stratcom remains something of a disputed concept, and without a single definition. 
According to Halloran (2007), Stratcom is a way of persuading others to accept one’s 
ideas, policies, or course of action; it means persuading adversaries that one has the 
power and the will to prevail over them. Such formulation blurs the differences 
between Stratcom and information Operations that yet other analysts have tried to 
explain, with equally little precision or success.7 However, all available definitions of 
Stratcom share one common major theme, in focusing on an ability to affect the 
perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of key audiences in support of specific interests, 
policies and objectives8. Since this is exactly what the insurgent groups are doing 
through their information activities, we may apply the term Stratcom, even if 
acknowledging at the same time that the insurgents do not separate the “informing” 
part from the “influencing” piece as nATO does. Such a stretched concept of Stratcom 
presents no difficulty for the author, and should not for the reader.
Below, we aim to present and put into context the ends, ways and means adop-
ted and the associated methods, techniques and procedures used by the insurgents 
in Afghanistan in their communications campaign. it is not our intention to com-
 6 classification of insurgents’ information activities has not gathered consensus among academics. 
nissen (2007) states, for instance, that can be no question that the Taliban conducts “information 
warfare” in Afghanistan and worldwide. What is debatable in his eyes, however, is how the 
Taliban achieves this, not least in comparison with nATO/iSAF Strategic communications and 
Military information Operations. nissen questions what terminology should nATO use to 
describe the Taliban’s activities in order to distinguish them from nATO information operations.
 7 On this discussion see, for instance Murphy (2008) or more recently the testimony of Rosa 
Brooks (2011) before the House Armed Services Sub -committee on evolving Threats and ca-
pabilities, where she discusses the often confused use of Stratcom together with and in place 
of related terms such as “information operations,’ “public diplomacy” and “communications”. 
She asserted the need “to draw some distinctions between these concepts, however, since 
otherwise we can start getting very muddled up”. 
 8 For instance, Allied command Operations (AcO) directive 95 -2 (AcO Strategic communica-
tions), 2 november 2009 (UncLAS / Releasable) states that Stratcom has a central role to play 
through all stages of operations and managing public perceptions. it is also stated that Stratcom 
takes in all components of the information campaign; even if direction on public diplomacy 
and political guidance is to remain the responsibility of nATO HQ (public diplomacy is an 
activity to be conducted only at the strategic -political level). nATO Stratcom is therefore the 
coordinated and appropriate use of nATO communications activities and capabilities, i.e. all 
of Public diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, information Operations (info 
Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, 
operations and activities, in order to advance nATO’s aims. 
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pare what the insurgents and the international Security and Assistance Force (iSAF) 
and the Government of the islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GiRoA) do relative to 
one another. On occasion, however, such comparisons can happen since Stratcom 
is a holistic approach that requires a holistic understanding that must also include 
cross reference to others. That the insurgents do not constitute a homogeneous body 
of opinion does not and should not prevent us from recognizing their adoption of 
a strategic and coordinated approach to communications9. 
Kinetic Actions in Support of a Non ‑Kinetic Campaign
The planning of kinetic actions to support the non -kinetic campaign is a particu-
lar feature of the insurgency strategy. Such kinetic operations can be seen to be 
specifically designed to influence wider attitudes or perceptions (international crisis 
Group, 2008). The reason for that resides in the fact that insurgents are cognizant that 
they cannot win on the battleground (and that they do not have to). They do not 
need to defeat militarily either the Afghan government or the forces of iSAF in order 
to win. central to their strategy is that they simply need to wear out their opponents, 
including by influencing perceptions at home and abroad. 
That strategy intends to bring decision makers to believe that their objectives 
are either unachievable, or too costly for the perceived benefit. insurgency/counter-
-insurgency is a type of conflict where cognition plays a decisive role. Being fully 
aware that the potential of combat is measured not only in economic and military 
power, the insurgents deliberately try to debilitate and destroy their enemy’s po-
litical will to continue fighting. Time would indeed appear to be in their favor, and 
they appear highly conscious of how difficult it is to maintain the political will 
needed to sustain a decades -long effort10. 
Several instances illustrate this argument. Among many, we have chosen the 
Serena Hotel suicide attack of January 14th, 2008, and the assassination attempt on 
President Hamid Karzai on April 27th, 2008, at a military parade in Kabul. These 
 9 As dorronsoro (2009) has pointed out, the diversity of the insurgency confuses many foreign 
observers. The Taliban’s structure is centralized enough to be efficient, but flexible and diverse 
enough to adapt to local contexts. The local autonomy of Taliban commanders is necessary due 
to the nature of the guerrilla warfare they are engaged in. The Haqqani network is not inde-
pendent of the larger Taliban network, and does not have an autonomous strategy.
10 This is particularly true given the practical necessity, for electoral purposes in modern democra-
cies, to put emphasis on short term political drivers at the expense of arguably larger but longer 
term issues. As the insurgent leaders are reported to have repeatedly taken as their maxim: “you 
(the international community and its forces) may have the watches, but we have the time”.
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audacious events did not produce significant casualties or damage, but did get the 
global media headlines they were designed for: to raise doubts among Afghans 
about the capacity of Afghan security forces, and conveyed both locally and inter-
nationally the requisite messages of strength and deterioration.
Similar intent lay behind the attacks on the US embassy and iSAF Headquarters, 
on 13 September 2011, also in Kabul. These underscored the insurgents’ desire to 
dominate the media, and to overshadow the West’s proclamations that the Afghan 
government and security forces would soon be able to handle the insurgency. 
Though not significant militarily, such spectacular attacks nonetheless serve to 
weaken trust in the Afghan government and offered a demonstration that the Ta-
liban could outmaneuver their opponents at will (Rubin, Rivera and Healy, 2011). 
invariably, the perpetrators of these actions are all killed and the physical damage 
they cause is relatively insignificant. The real impact and damage is on the popu-
lace’s perceptions, and in undermining belief in any process of transition. 
The insurgents combine traditional insurgency methods with modern commu-
nications systems to disseminate the results of their actions, deliberately attacking 
the mind of decision makers further afield (Hammes, 2004). in a deliberate strate-
gic option, they engage their adversaries in the field where they can have com-
petitive advantage. They explore and feed the appetite of western media outlets 
for spectacular events, and use them to provoke psychological impact in western 
decision makers and public opinion. it is not only a matter of tactical details: they 
also focus on areas of truly strategic effect, seeking to discredit the legitimacy of 
the Afghan government, and to portray an image of chaos in the country and in-
capacity of the government forces. 
Stratfor (2011a) provides a similar explanation for these actions:
“…There are however many ways tactical engagements can contribute to larger, strategic ends. 
Taliban efforts must be viewed not simply in terms of casualty metrics but also in terms of their 
impact on psychology and perception. Thus, any headline -grabbing attack that shifts perceptions 
within the occupier’s domestic populace can have a strategic impact, even when tactically the 
attack is ineffective…”
The Implicit Assumptions of the Insurgents’ StratCom Campaign
We argue the insurgents have designed their Stratcom campaign taking into 
account two crucial implicit assumptions: the rural nature of the insurgency and 
the literacy level of the population. The themes and messages chosen and the ways 
and means employed by the insurgents reflect these two factors. 
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The insurgents’ communications campaign was “designed” against the truism 
that the Afghan insurgency was to be (and still is) mainly rural. This is why their 
main target population remains rural Afghanistan, and it will be in the rural, not in 
the urban areas that the war is to be won. This understanding has shaped their 
communication efforts, and the center of gravity of their communications effort can 
be seen to be located in rural areas. This very principle also drives their military 
strategy, especially when we speak about the creation of rural bases, crucial not only 
for provision of intelligence but also for logistic support and as a base for recruitment. 
Many members of the insurgent groups are from the same villages where they 
operate and are active. This gives them a major competitive advantage in gaining 
intelligence, particularly given the Afghan national Security Forces (AnSF) demo-
graphics and since the international forces are alien in every sense of the word, and 
in the absence of effective leadership in establishing social and other bonds with 
the local people. The insurgents have the required experience and background for 
the design and implementation of village -oriented psychological operations. The 
Afghan Government and its supporters among the international stakeholders have 
in direct contrast been targeting primarily the urban population – who though 
inclined to support the central authorities and reap the economic and other benefits 
that come with it, are not vital in winning the war. 
despite the lack of accurate data, a number of experts and studies (MdGR, 2005) 
estimate the literacy rate in 2004 of those aged 15 and above was 34% (50% for men 
and 18% for women). in rural areas, where 74 percent of all Afghans live, however, 
an estimated 90 percent of women and 63 percent of men cannot read, write or car-
ry out simple computation (the rates are only somewhat better in urban areas). Ac-
cording to an icG report (2008), less than a quarter of the Afghan adult population 
is estimated to be literate, with only two percent claiming to read newspapers regu-
larly. Around a third of households have a television and 88 per cent radios, while 
only a tiny fraction of the population has access to the internet. it is interesting to 
note that the use of SMS text messaging to access news and information has risen 
dramatically (from 9% in 2007 to 10% in 2008, to 19% in 2009 and 25% in 2010).11
Understanding such social realities determines the insurgents’ communications 
focus, and will be covered below. insurgent channels of communication indeed do 
make intensive use of visual and audio mediums in order to reach the largest pos-
sible rural population, in detriment of written forms such as magazines and other 
11 For more detailed information on this topic see chapter 12.5 “Sources of information on local 
events” of the Asia Foundation’s report “Afghanistan in 2010. A Survey of the Afghan People”: 
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/ pdfs/Afghanistanin2010survey.pdf.
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publications more oriented to external audiences.12 in addition, insurgents’ Stratcom 
campaign is also designed around an all -Muslim call than can overcome inter -ethnic 
rivalries and prejudices, and unite every Muslim against the common enemy13. As 
we will see, the islamic messages avoid any reference to regions, ethnic groups, 
languages or individuals (iSAF, 2008).
Ways and Means to Reach Different Segments of the Audience 
The insurgents have broken down their potential audience into different seg-
ments and have identified their separate information requirements. To reach each 
of them, they have developed tailored themes and messages, and use different 
means of delivery, all adapted to the requirement. They differentiate between the 
rural – their priority target – and urban populations, while avoiding communication 
policies oriented on an ethnic group basis.14 externally, there is a suitably defined 
differentiation between regional and international target groups15. The criterion for 
this differentiation is done through the idioms they use to convey their messages. 
To communicate with the most backward segments of the society, with little or 
no access to print media, television or internet (accessible only to a minority almost 
exclusively urban population), the insurgents use the so -called “traditional” meth-
ods of communication16. This is where the insurgents arguably have their greatest 
12 notwithstanding, the insurgents have developed some magazines like the Arabic -language Al 
Somood (Standing Firm) and a few publications more closely linked with global issues and 
movements, aimed at building wider support and getting recruits and financing.
13 This call exposes a crucial political contradiction that insurgents were not yet able to solve: how 
can revolutionary ethnic Pashtun -based group, whose social base of support lies basically in the 
Pasthun tribes living in the South and east of the country, call for the unity of all Muslims to fight 
for the establishment of an islamic emirate in Afghanistan? The Taliban have their center of gravi-
ty among the Durani tribes like Norzais, Barekzai, Popalzai, Alekozai and Eshaqzai, in the southern 
Afghanistan, particularly in the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul and Oruzgan; the HiG is 
active mainly in the provinces of Kunar, nuristan, Laghman, Paktya, Paktika and Khost. The 
Taliban are also active in these areas but are not as entrenched as they are in southern Afghanistan.
14 it is important to note that insurgents have also subdivided their segments. They differentiate 
between the rural populace and their leaders, the latter deserving special treatment. in nATO’s 
jargon, the actions oriented to engage with tribal elders are called Key Leaders engagement. 
15 Other authors have chosen other ways of audience segmentation. The icG (2008) has identified 
four types of insurgents’ distinct audiences: supporters, the mass of undecided population, the 
coalition decision -makers and the transnational extremist networks from which the insurgents 
aim to draw resources, building on the three types Hammes (2004: 209) has identified suppor-
ters, undecided population, coalition decision -makers. 
16 This designation is challenged by some authors. We use it for the sake of simplicity.
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strength. inability to read and write among the majority of the population neces-
sarily reinforces the importance of the oral forms of communication such as one-
-on -one, face -to -face, engagement with tribal elders, and with poets and singers as 
forms of communication among Afghans. 
The insurgents use them extensively as channels of communication to strength-
en their relationship with the population. These actions nearby the population are 
normally complemented by ciMic -like measures, which permit to establish a direct 
relationship between social action and psychological operations.17 
in rural areas, bazaars play a very important role in the circulation of information, 
and are used to spread rumors and advertise the insurgents’ activities. especially in 
the South and east of the countries, insurgents have been intensively using the bazaars 
to convey their messages. night letters (shabnamah) are another element in the insur-
gents’ communication armory, and are used to intimidate and coerce – again mainly 
in rural areas. They consist of printed and often handwritten messages, delivered to 
a specific person with the intent of influencing his behavior (nissen, 2007).
notes scattered in or near villages, or pushed under doorways by insurgent 
militants during the night threaten lives if they cooperate with foreign forces and 
the government (Baker, 2008). This tactic is understandably very effective, and is 
carefully targeted: teachers have been chosen as a preferred target, but also those 
working with the international forces or the government. discouraging the popula-
tion, especially females, to attend schools is also high on the insurgent agenda.
Poetry remains a major oral tradition. Poetry and songs play also an important 
role in the war on hearts and minds. Poetry and songs plays are means insurgents 
to get their messages out and have several roles: national exaltation, to recruit 
fighters, funding and raise public support18. Within the past three decades of war 
and political turmoil, poetry has been greatly politicized. Subsequently, it has played 
a prominent role in shaping and the expression of political views among Afghans 
(Shaaker, 2009). 
The insurgents also pay special attention to other groups with social leverage, 
such as religious hierarchies. They have understood the central role that Mullahs and 
Mosques can play in the battle for perceptions, especially in rural populations. Young 
Pakistan -trained Mullahs are brought in to spread their messages, as a strategic tool 
17 We mean as social action the support provided to the population by the insurgents, to help 
solving their most urgent needs such a medical and financial support, among other issues.
18 Brown and Sagalyn (2011) tell the story of a chant about Malali, an Afghan woman war hero 
who fought against the British a century ago, encouraging people to join today’s war against 
foreigners.
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for propaganda and brain washing of the communities. Mosques serve as much today 
as a tipping point as they have been in the moments of major political crisis of the 
past three centuries of Afghan history. Yet they have arguably never been as crucial 
in winning the Stratcom battle as they have been in the past thirty years19.
in terms of engaging the urban population, the insurgents have developed some 
video and audio material. cd’s, dVd’s and audio cassettes contain messages call-
ing for recruitment and boosting morale; songs and poetry sympathetic to the in-
surgency are passed on, particularly religious songs and taranas, and martial, na-
tionalist songs with high emotional sentiment.20 Some are “…tied closely to Afghan 
imagery and history, not necessarily produced by the Taliban but aimed at building 
wider sympathy for the insurgency within the population. While some songs refer 
directly to Taliban activities, they mainly simply aim to heighten resistance to forei-
gners and appeal to nationalism…” (icG, 2008: 16). 
dVds nearly always show attacks on government, international forces and 
equipment seized or destroyed21. instances of raids, especially where there has been 
cultural disrespect, are used to portray the international military presence as an act 
of occupation. Many of these are also either sold or distributed to journalists in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
in the last years, non -Afghan audiences – regional and international – have 
increased in importance in the insurgents’ priorities. More than in the 1990s, the 
Taliban today are connected to international Jihadist networks, and seek political 
support by opposing foreign occupation (dorronsoro, 2009). cyberspace has become 
a preferred channel for such communications with foreigners, and immense prog-
ress has been made in this domain.22 More technically sophisticated means like 
internet, Facebook and Twitter are no longer only for the very few, and it is origi-
nally surprising how a movement that completely banned photography, music, 
television and the use of the internet on the grounds of being un -islamic, rapidly 
came to understand and reap the benefits of these tools (Gwakh, 2011). The Taliban 
have been present in cyberspace through a website since mid -2005. 
19 Mosques play, to a certain extent, the same social role factories played in the beginning of the 
industrial era, as underscore by Karl Marx, or the Facebook in the information age: gather the 
masses with a common reason and permits the communication. it provides the psychological 
sense of togetherness. 
20 Tarana wauniki means in Pasthun those who sing without being accompanied by musical ins-
truments.
21 Many other topics are included: archival footage from the fight against Soviet forces and the 
Soviet -backed regime, images from iraq, insurgent training, etc. 
22 even Mullah Mohammad Omar has his own fan page.
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The importance the insurgents give to international audiences is also evident 
in the number of languages they use for communication on their websites. each 
language has a specific target audience in mind: english has gained more significant 
prominence and is used to reach international audiences and get global attention. 
it is also used in the dealings with international media outlets; Pashtu, Dari and 
Urdu are aimed at regional groups, especially those living in Pakistan; and Arabic 
is used to communicate with appropriate wider transnational networks. 
The Taliban possess several internet domains, which host official content and 
have backup domains in case of an attack on the main website (Gwakh, 2011). 
Messages are now much more coherent than in the past, and distant are the days 
when the rudimentary english used in their websites was difficult to understand. 
After the Taliban assault to the US embassy in Kabul drew to a close, insurgents 
prolonged the engagement with international forces in cyberspace, on Twitter and 
exchanging words directly23, demonstrating considerable affinity with text -speak24. 
The insurgents have equally shown a capacity to learn from their experiences 
and mistakes. initially, their website was fairly basic including only updates on the 
military situation, normally providing only their exaggerated versions of events 
and with posts only in Pashtu and Arabic. in 2006, material in Dari, Urdu and en-
glish was added; only the pages in Pashtu and Dari were updated regularly. From 
mid -2006 the website was being updated daily, and often more than once per day 
(Tarzi, 2009: 399). 
Today, the website is updated several times a day in five languages and has 
turned into a propaganda machine25. Beyond military events, the site also includes 
leadership statements, literature, poetry, interviews, extended articles and commen-
tary, as well as links to affiliated magazines. insurgents use also their websites to 
direct poets and singers the content of the messages they should include in their 
poems and songs. The so called cultural Affairs commission of the islamic emi-
rate advises poets and singers on their website they have an islamic duty in order 
to make their mission more effective.26
23 For a tour d’ horizon over this discussion see Siddique (2011). One of the topics was a dispute 
on statistics of civilian casualties caused by each side. 
24 The Taliban uses several Twitter accounts, in english (@alemarahweb) and in Arabic (@alsomood).
25 Although the Taliban has numerous blogs and websites, Al -Emarah.net and Shahamat.info 
(mostly videos) are considered the official websites and the source of “certified” propaganda.
26 “…it would be ideal if our poets and singers write and sing poems that raise the morale, pa-
tience and sentiments of the nation and which becomes a thorn in the eyes of the enemy. They 
should avoid poems and songs that do not have the message of comfort; patience and deter-
mination for the grief stricken mojahed family and which on the contrary increase their grief 
and pain or signal lack of patience and weakness on the part of the mojahedin…efforts should 
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The Taliban has nowadays numerous accounts on Twitter which they fill with 
their own brand of exaggeration. in a new move, in 2010 english also became the 
language of the insurgents’ Twitter account. This change provoked significantly in-
creased followers. However, it is not used to interact with those same followers, be-
cause it works mainly as a one -way dissemination tool. Like the websites, the majo-
rity of the Taliban “Tweets” are about attacks against international troops or afghan 
soldiers and police. As on some Facebook accounts, they also provide links to videos 
of suicide bombings and insurgents’ attacks on Afghan and international forces.
YouTube has also become a new battlefield for the insurgents. They handle 
video cameras as weapons. insurgents have shown a great ability to broadcast 
videos, sometimes only one hour after an event has occurred. They are able to 
upload the internet with the images of their attacks with an astonishing speed using 
them, among other things, to boost the morale of their supporters.
Over the past decade, the insurgents have dramatically improved their public 
relations skills27. The insurgents communicate with journalists on a daily basis, 
through several ways: e -mails, spokespersons and targets stringers28 via texts to 
mobile phones. Their various spokespersons maintain regular contacts with jour-
nalists by phone, through emails, SMS, provide online reports on incidents and 
respond to queries around the clock. 
The insurgents have shown an incredible capacity to put out its story rapidly. 
The media becomes frequently aware of attacks via the insurgents and not through 
Afghan or nATO officials29. Such speed is explained because they do not need to 
be made to write poems that have a clear jihad and national message, lesson and aim and are 
not just useless lamentations or statements in praise of individuals, a region or language. They 
should signal profound asocial meaning and inspirations…” (iSAF, 2008).
27 On this issue see “Taliban propaganda goes from strength to strength” posted on the blog 
Circling the Lion’s Den.
28 A stringer is a type of freelance journalist or photographer who contributes reports or photos 
to a news organization on an ongoing basis, but is paid individually for each piece of published 
or broadcast work. As freelancers, stringers do not receive a regular salary and the amount and 
type of work is typically voluntary. However, stringers often have an ongoing relationship with 
one or more news organizations, to which they provide content on particular topics or locations 
when the opportunities arise. Afghanistan territory is covered by a good network of local stringers.
29 But sometimes speed has its inconvenient: discredit when more than one insurgent organization 
claims the authorship of the same attack or tells contradictory stories, which happens frequen-
tly. it happened with the assassination of Rabbani, the High Peace council chairman, when the 
same spokesperson claimed in three successive days competing versions of the event via diffe-
rent means. Roughly three hours after the assassination, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid 
claimed the responsibility on behalf of the Taliban while speaking to a Reuter’s reporter over 
the phone. However, a day later, the same Mujahid made another statement, this time published 
on the Afghan Taliban Voice of Jihad website, repudiating his earlier claim of the Taliban’s res-
ponsibility. A message on the Taliban Twitter account @Abalkhi on the same day also denied 
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establish facts. Whereas international forces normally must investigate the veracity 
of the claim before going public with details, the Taliban version of the same incident 
is already circulating30 and the message gaining momentum. 
One stringer working for Reuters said that every time the Taliban launch an 
attack or troops call in an air strike, he gets a message (Kevin, 2008). in other cases, 
they take the initiative to phone the offices of the news agencies in Kabul within 
moments of a nATO air strike. independent verification of the facts takes time. in 
many cases, this is not possible to conciliate with the pressure media outlets are 
submitted. The battle of competing press statements often leads them to publish 
the insurgents scoops without cross checking. The difficulty is because the interna-
tional forces have to provide responses on due time that favors the insurgents.31 
The Taliban has created an infrastructure to support this effort. This includes a 
body – a so called Media committee – that supervises and controls the implemen-
tation of their plans; and several production studios.32 The quality of the films 
produced in these studios has been improving immensely, and from there the films 
are distributed on Taliban websites, passed from mobile phone to mobile phone 
(now very fashionable), and reaching broader audiences through other channels, such 
as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. By benchmarking the iraqi insurgents’ experience, 
the Afghan insurgents have taken full advantage of the widespread use of mobile 
phones throughout Afghanistan to spread their message or to deliver threats.
The Themes and Messages
The insurgent Stratcom campaign is centered on a number of core themes de-
veloped in the different messages they convey to all audiences through the different 
channels of communication at their disposal.33 Their messages are very similar to 
that Mujahid had spoken to Reuters and, in statements posted online and sent by email, the 
group accused Reuters of publishing “baseless news.” Reuters then issued an article on the 
conflicting Mujahid claims. The wire service claimed that Mujahid called a third time on Tues-
day to tell the reporter that Taliban leadership was in disagreement over whether to provide 
the names of those responsible for the attack, as it could create problems for some people in 
the movement. See Georgy (2011) and Stratfor (2011). 
30 investigation of deaths is not an easy job, especially when the event has occurred in remote 
areas. According to the islamic tradition the corps has to be buried before 24 hours the dead 
has occurred making the forensic analysis impossible. 
31 For an informative discussion on this issue, see Kevin (2008).
32 One of the most important studios where videos are made is al -Sahab, the Taliban’s media 
center in Quetta, Pakistan. When finalized, videos become immediately available in the internet.
33 We consider “themes” those overarching ideas that must be sent to the target audiences. Within 
each Theme support messages will be derived. Those are more detailed ideas that reinforce the 
theme. For detailed information on this topic see, for instance, Bragg (2009: 329). 
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those employed by the national liberation movements of the fifties and sixties that 
fought colonial empires, notably in Africa. We classify the themes in two major 
groups: one with ideological flavor which constitutes the backbone of their argu-
mentative narrative; and other, more contextual and circumstances driven, which 
results from the attempts to capitalize from the perceived government and inter-
national forces wrongdoings. 
central to their argumentation is the accusation that foreigners are colonial 
powers which are in Afghanistan to loot the wealth of the country. The internatio-
nal forces are epitomized as invaders. This accusation is supplemented by a strong 
ideological ingredient, not Marxist as old revolutionaries did, but religious in na-
ture. This leads us to a second theme: international forces are not only invaders 
but also infidels; therefore, the international intervention is just a chapter of a 
wider war against islam. The infidels are crusaders who want to convert Muslims 
to christianity and to abandon their religion in exchange for dollars.34 This theme 
is developed through messages with an intense historical narrative made of a 
number of sketches about the fight against the infidel invaders: the insurgents will 
remain in Afghanistan after the departure of the international forces; Afghanistan 
is a graveyard of empires, etc. 
Also in the ideological realm, the exacerbation of Afghan nationalism is other 
frequent theme: “…We [Taliban] will never forgive those people who brought the 
Americans to our territory and those who entered Kabul supported by American 
warplanes, because the nation will never forgive them: they have sold their Afghan 
identity and freedom…” (icG, 2008: 22).
As mentioned before, the insurgent movement is deeply opposed to the Afghan 
tribal system and is focused on the rebuilding of the islamic emirate. An all -Muslim 
call that can overcome inter -ethnic rivalries and prejudices, against the common 
infidel enemy has always been present in their messages. According to a post on 
the Taliban website, the cultural Affairs commission of the islamic emirate advises 
poets and singers “…to avoid the aspirations of the jihad to the achievements of a 
region, language or individual…and to avoid damage to the lofty interests of the 
country and islamic unity…” and proceeds “…mentioning individuals in songs 
may on occasions be harmful to them and can also pave the way to ill feelings and 
rivalry, and thus should be avoided…” (iSAF, 2008).
Without intending to be comprehensive, we will hereafter present the most used 
contextual and circumstances driven themes that insurgents use trying to capitalize 
from the perceived government and international forces wrongdoings. One frequent 
34 interview of Taliban spokesperson Mohammad Yusof Ahmadi to the Taliban website, 10 May 
2008, and published by the Taliban Voice of Jihad website on 11 May.
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theme is to portray Karzai and his administration as puppets of the foreign powers. 
Building upon this theme and exploiting local disenfranchisement and disillusion-
ment, the insurgents build messages on the widely perceived corruption of the 
Afghan government, and their incapacity to deliver basic services to the people.
Two other recurrent contextual driven themes that have been present in the 
insurgents’ Stratcom campaign35 and that shaped the information battlefield are 
the civilian casualties allegedly caused by military action of international forces, 
notably through the use of air power; and the disrespect and aggression to the 
Afghan culture and traditions caused by night raids on Afghan residences. As 
pointed out in the icG Asia Report (2008), civilian deaths resonate enormously in 
communities, particularly given the terrible memories of the Soviet bombing cam-
paigns. Statements of alleged abuses and casualties caused by overreaction of in-
ternational forces, updated online several times a day and emailed, telephoned or 
sent as text messages to journalists are regularly found in Taliban magazines and 
online publications.
insurgents try to benefit from the malign impact that arbitrary detentions and 
night raids have on the population, using them in their information war against 
the Afghan government. night raids have produced a bitter sentiment in the pre-
sidential palace and are responsible for some President Karzai’s anti -western de-
clarations, in an attempt to appease his constituents.36 
Key in the insurgents’ Stratcom campaign is the need to present themselves 
more stronger and skilled than the Afghan and international forces, capable of 
inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. This theme in its various facets has been used 
as a “force multiplier”. exaggerations and lies in their reports, claiming victories 
and successes of facts that were in most cases not yet established, and hiding their 
own military losses serve the purpose to show themselves as a powerful, skilled 
and victorious force capable of shaping the battlefield. 
in one or another way, all these themes and messages have contributed to ero-
de and damage popular support for the intervention. The insurgents were able to 
develop themes and messages that are, in the majority of the cases, acts of propa-
35 On the insurgent’s ability to manipulate the issue of civilian casualties allegedly caused by 
coalition forces and on the damage it is causing on afghan and international public opinion 
see, for instance, naylor (2011). 
36 Karzai often receives in the Presidential Palace delegations of tribal elders from the provinces 
complaining of international forces’ lack of respect for the Afghan culture and traditions. See, 
for instance Farmer (2003). President Karzai public appeals to the international forces to treat 
religion and traditions of the country with respect are frequent. He has been claiming for the 
need to “change behaviour and to stop knocking on people’s door in the night time, entering 
people’s homes by force and arresting civilians.” 
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ganda warfare built upon the legitimate complaints of the populace. They were 
capable to fuel existing grievances, suspicions and perceptions and have contribu-
ted to driving a wedge between the Afghan people and the Karzai government and 
its international supporters. 
Final Remarks
in this essay, we tried to explain that insurgents have indeed a Stratcom strat-
egy. They approach strategic communications in a systematic manner. insurgents 
have a structure and have developed a strategic planning capacity. Portraying the 
insurgents as a disperse network of fighters without a centralized command is not 
correct and is not useful at all. it is not true either in the operational or in the com-
munications fields. We can perfectly identify in the communications domain the 
paradigm of a strategy planning with the development of clear, logical and practi-
cal goals and the creation of a relationship between ends, ways and means. 
The objective – the end – they want to achieve with the strategic communications 
campaign is threefold: to gain the support of the Afghan population, regardless of 
their ethnic or religious background, to establish an islamic emirate in Afghanistan 
which is subordinate to Sharia Law; to gain the support of would -be regional sup-
porters; and erode domestic public support of the international forces’ continuation 
of the military campaign. To achieve this, they have segmented their target audien-
ces in several segments, as mentioned in the text, and used different ways and 
means to reach each of them. 
The form used to pursue their strategy – the ways – was using kinetic operations 
in support of the non -kinetic campaign. Because the insurgents are cognizant that 
they cannot win international forces on the battleground, they opted by wearing 
out their opponents, including by influencing perceptions at home and abroad. This 
fundamental reasoning influenced their military strategy. Kinetic operations can be 
seen to be specifically designed to influence wider attitudes or perceptions.37
The ways considered by insurgents are very much adapted to the different seg-
ments they want to target. in the largely illiterate rural Afghanistan, insurgents 
prefer to use the so -called “traditional” methods of communication such as one -to-
-one and face -to -face in the villages and in the bazaars, and engagement with 
tribal elders. We can also include night letters, poetry and songs in this chapter 
37 From our view this is valid for both insurgencies and counter -insurgencies. not only the in-
surgency but also the counter -insurgency has to be recognized as primarily an information war 
supported by military action.
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although they are not exclusively used to influence only a single segment.38 Those 
methods are accompanied by physical and other psychological methods of intimi-
dation and coercion.
Although we can notice sometimes some overlap, to engage urban, regional or 
international audiences the methods are quite different. The insurgents have reco-
gnized the modern technology and media can be useful for the insurgency. They 
have demonstrated in the last decade a tremendous capacity to learn and adapt 
quickly to changes in the situation.39 To reach urban population they used cd’s, 
dVd’s, audio cassettes and mobile phones. But in regards to reaching more geo-
graphically distant segments, the internet plays a crucial role. Websites, Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube became common ways to convey their messages. 
The insurgents have also a large arsenal of resources – means – to conduct their 
Stratcom campaign capable to cover all the target segments. Like bazaars, mosques 
also play an undisputed Stratcom role in rural Afghanistan. That is why there is 
a well -orchestrated campaign to bring into Afghanistan young Pakistan -trained 
Mullahs and remove those who are pro -government in the districts and provinces. 
Tribal elders, poets and singers are also elements of the informational engine. 
The insurgents have created an organizational structure to support those acti-
vities. different functions are the responsibility of different bodies. The cultural 
Affairs commission of the islamic emirate is the top body responsible for planning 
and supervision of the communications activities. The implementation is in the 
hands of several studios that prepare the different products and send them to the 
final consumers.40 This is a machine which operates with a high level of synchro-
nization.
This is particularly evident in the speed which incidents, sometimes in remote 
areas, are addressed by the insurgents’ spokespersons and passed to the media. 
This requires discipline and the operation of a network of experienced and skilled 
operators. it does not simply happen by chance. it is a systematic effort involving 
many dimensions, following a rational and serving a purpose, in profit of a very 
well defined overall goal, only possible to achieve if subordinate to and consistent 
with a very well established strategy. 
38 insurgents invest heavily in the village level engagement expecting that micro level effort bears 
strategic results.
39 Like westerns, they have also incorporated in their practices procedures already tested in iraq.
40 See, for instance, Taliban Media Production centre: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2i 
junYAF4Y.
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